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I. INTRODUCTION
When you think of impersonation, the first thing to come to
mind might be a mime mirroring a passerby’s inattentive, hurried
walk, or an actress in Disneyland dressed as Elsa from Frozen,
twirling around with a child. As benign and jovial as this type of
impersonation may be, the law correctly recognizes that
impersonation has a much darker side.1
1.

See generally Tex. Penal Code § 32.51 (West 2016).
51

52
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Traditional criminal impersonation included crimes like posing
as another person, using someone’s identification card, or
pretending to be a police officer to arrest another civilian. 2
However, society changes and the law must evolve to conform with
new norms. For example, as credit and debit cards became a
preferred method of payment, Texas criminalized certain conduct
such as using another’s credit card as your own without the owner’s
consent.3 Today, the Internet and social media sites are inescapable
components of modern society. Approximately 1.9 billion people
use Facebook at least once a month and 800 million use Instagram
with the same frequency. 4 Because social media sites and blogs
identify users by their real or user name, impersonation and other
criminal activities have found new waters.
Following these tidal affairs,5 Texas enacted Penal Code section
33.07, criminalizing certain online impersonation. 6 Texas is not
alone in enacting this type of statute,7 and, like similar statutes in
sister states, the Texas statute is frequently litigated. 8 Recently,
following the lead of the courts before it, the Waco Court of Appeals
in Ex parte Maddison concluded that the statute is not overly broad
or vague and therefore does not violate the First Amendment.9
Unfortunately, the court failed to recognize the potential impact
of its precedent in the Maddison decision and the role the Internet
plays in today’s digital society. Not only is Texas’ online
impersonation statute unconstitutional, but the Maddison decision
highlights a First Amendment workaround that ultimately permits
the State to criminalize legitimate conduct, lump protected speech

2. TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.11 (West 2016).
3. TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.31(a)(1)(A) (West 2016).
4.
Seth Fiegerman, Facebook Tops 1.9 Billion Monthly Users, CNN (May 3,
2017, 5:46 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/03/technology/facebookearnings/index.html [https://perma.cc/2LMK-R3H8]; How Many People Use
Instagram?, MEDIAKIX (Mar. 23, 2017), http://mediakix.com/2017/03/howmany-people-use-instagram/#gs.mC3OHMii [https://perma.cc/XA4Y-7N9T].
5.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, CLIFFSCOMPLETE JULIUS CAESAR 134 (Diana
Sweeney ed., 2nd ed. 2000).
6. TEX. PENAL CODE § 33.07 (West 2017).
7.
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1450 (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. §
14:73.10 (2017).
8.
See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 873 (N.C. 2016) (finding a
similar statute to restrict free speech).
9.
Ex Parte Maddison, 518 S.W.3d 630, 640 (Tex. App.—Waco 2017, pet.
ref’d).
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into a pile of improperly criminalized conduct, and ignore the
content of the speech.
II. FAKE PROFILES AND NUDE PHOTOGRAPHS: MADDISON
BACKGROUND
In September 2014, Billy Mack Maddison was indicted 10 for
using his ex-wife’s name to create a Facebook profile “with the
intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten her.”11 The charge
was based on Texas Penal Code section 33.07(a)(1):
(a) A person commits an offense if the person, without obtaining the
other person’s consent and with the intent to harm, defraud,
intimidate, or threaten any person, uses the name or persona of
another person to: (1) create a web page on a commercial social
networking site or other Internet website.12

According to the complaint, Maddison created two Facebook
profiles, one in his ex-wife’s name and one in the name of a man.
Then, he sent friend requests to his ex-wife’s friends and family and
posted nude photographs of her on the profiles.13 His ex-wife had
previously taken and sent these photos to Maddison.14
In response to the charge and subsequent May 2014 arrest, 15
Maddison filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Nineteenth Judicial
District Court of Texas in Waco.16 On February 25, 2016, the trial
court ruled that all of “Penal Code § 33.07 is unconstitutionally
overbroad because it is a content-based restriction” that criminalizes

10.
Brief for Appellant at 1, Maddison, 518 S.W.3d 630 (No. 10-16-00081CR).
11. Tommy Witherspoon, Waco Judge Rules Texas Online Impersonation
Law Unconstitutional, Violates First Amendment, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD
(Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.wacotrib.com/news/courts_and_trials/waco-judgerules-texas-online-impersonation-law-unconstitutional-violatesfirst/article_d633811c-86d0-5dce-a3f5-924ff6591ba0.html
[https://perma.cc/E4XK-X6SK] (internal quotations omitted).
12.
§ 33.07.
13. Witherspoon, supra note 11.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 10, at ii, 1.
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First-Amendment-protected speech. 17 The State appealed to the
Texas Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco.18
III. THE WACO APPELLATE COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ANALYSIS IN
MADDISON
The appellate court held that because Maddison’s indictment
was only under subsection (a)(1) of section 33.07, it did not “have
jurisdiction to declare the entire statute unconstitutional.”19 Thus,
the trial court lacked sufficient jurisdiction to declare the entire
statute unconstitutional, and the Tenth Court of Appeals only
reviewed the constitutionality of section 33.07(a)(1).20
In a single issue, the State argued that the trial court incorrectly
granted Maddison’s application for writ of habeas corpus by
declaring § 33.07 unconstitutional based on overbreadth and
vagueness. 21 Though Maddison’s trial court brief and the State’s
appellate court brief addressed a Dormant Commerce Clause
argument, neither the trial court nor the appellate court addressed
that issue.22 In analyzing the constitutionality of section 33.07, the
appellate court first addressed the overbreadth issue, followed by
the vagueness issue.23
A. The Waco Court’s Faulty Analysis of Content Neutrality,
Scrutiny, and Overbreadth
In finding the statute not overbroad, the opinion analyzed the
applicable law, the meaning of section 33.07(a)(1), if speech
restricted by section 33.07(a)(1) is protected by the First
Amendment, and determined whether intermediate or strict scrutiny
applied.24 The court reviewed the facial constitutionality challenge
de novo and presumed the statute was valid, consequently placing
the burden on the party challenging the statute, Maddison, to prove
unconstitutionality.25
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 1; Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 633.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 10, at i.
Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 633.
Id. at 633, 635.
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id. at 635–40.
518 S.W.3d at 635–39.
Id. at 635.
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Drawing rationale from the Stubbs opinion, the court noted that
the First Amendment “limits the government’s power to regulate
speech based on its substantive content.”26 For that reason, in an
initial step to determine if section 33.07(a)(1) implicated speech and
could encroach on First Amendment territory, the court looked to
the plain meaning of the statute. 27 Presuming every word in the
statute had effect, and citing to the Bradshaw opinion, the court held
that section 33.07(a)(1)’s purpose was clear.28 The court described
the “forbidden conduct [as] taking another’s identity, without
consent and with the requisite intent, and using [it] to make certain
electronic communications.”29
Because the conduct addressed by the statute concerned speech,
the court considered if that speech was protected by the First
Amendment.30 Maddison claimed that the proscribed conduct was
inherently expressive and protected by the First Amendment.31 As
a counter, the court noted that speech “integral to criminal conduct
. . . may be prevented and punished without violating the First
Amendment.” 32 Ultimately, the Maddison court presumed the
statute could implicate protected speech.33
Because the statute could presumably implicate protected
speech, the court went on to consider whether the statute was
content based or content neutral.34 A content-based statute “imposes
differential burdens upon speech because of its content” but a
content-neutral statute does not. 35 Importantly, content-based
regulation is subject to strict scrutiny while content-neutral
regulation is subject to intermediate scrutiny.36 Therefore, contentbased regulation must serve a compelling state interest and employ
26.
Id. (citing State v. Stubbs, 502 S.W.3d 218, 224 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d)).
27.
Id. at 636.
28.
Id. at 636–37 (citing Ex Parte Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d 665, 673 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2016, pet. ref’d)).
29.
Id. at 637 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at
673).
30.
Id.
31.
Id. at 637 (quoting Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 334 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014)).
32.
Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 674).
33.
Id. at 638.
34.
Ex Parte Maddison, 518 S.W.3d 630, 638 (Tex. App.—Waco 2017, pet.
ref’d).
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
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the least speech-restrictive means to achieve its goal, whereas
content-neutral regulation need only promote a significant
government interest and not substantially burden speech more than
necessary to further that interest.37 Under either level of scrutiny,
the court suggested that an “overbreadth challenge will rarely, if
ever, succeed against a statute ‘that is not specifically addressed to
speech or to conduct that is necessarily associated with speech (such
as picketing or demonstrating).’”38 If the court finds a reasonable
statutory construction rendering the statute constitutional, the
statute will be upheld.39
Without providing any original analysis, the court summarized
the Stubbs and Bradshaw courts’ reasoning in explanatory
parentheticals and asserted that section 33.07(a)(1) does not restrict
a certain topic, subject matter, or speech, or otherwise target a
particular viewpoint.40 For that reason, following the courts before
it, the court concluded that section 33.07(a)(1) was content-neutral
and, thus, subject to intermediate scrutiny.41
Applying intermediate scrutiny, and again deferring to the
Bradshaw court’s reasoning, the court claimed that the statute
served a significant governmental interest by protecting Texas
citizens from impersonation, fraud, and abuse online. 42
Furthermore, the court asserted that the statute served a First
Amendment interest by ensuring that online speech is actually made
by the purported user. 43 Finally, the court concluded that
Maddison’s hypothetically unconstitutional applications were
insubstantial when compared to constitutional applications. 44 For
these reasons, the court held that Maddison failed to prove section
33.07(a)(1) facially unconstitutional.45
In summary, after reviewing the matter de novo, the court
concluded that any speech associated with conduct prohibited by
section 33.07(a)(1) may be silenced without violating the First
37.
Id. at 635–36.
38.
Id. at 636 (quoting State v. Johnson, 475 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015)).
39.
Madison, 518 S.W.3d at 636.
40.
Id. at 638 (quoting Stubbs, 502 S.W.3d at 231) (internal quotations
omitted).
41.
Id. at 639.
42.
Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 676–77).
43.
Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 676–77).
44.
518 S.W.3d at 639.
45.
Id.
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Amendment.46 Additionally, the court held that even if the statute
affected some protected speech, it was insignificant in comparison
to the legitimate sweep of the statute.47 Thus, the court determined
that the statute did not materially conflict with First Amendment
protections and was not unconstitutionally overbroad.48
B. The Waco Court’s Limited Analysis of Vagueness
The majority opinion’s brief analysis of vagueness relied
heavily on the reasoning from the Bradshaw court.49 The Bradshaw
court explained that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if “persons
of common intelligence” must guess at its meaning. 50 Though a
statute does not have to be exactly precise, all criminal laws “must
give fair notice about what activity is made criminal.” 51
Furthermore, the law must be definite enough to avoid chilling
protected expression. 52 As related to standing and a defendant’s
permissible arguments, a person may complain of the statute’s
application to other people’s speech if it is unclear if the statute
unconstitutionally regulates a substantial amount of free speech.53
The court applied this law to Maddison’s contention that the
“harm” standard set forth in section 33.07(a)(1) was too vague.54
Ultimately, the court again agreed with Bradshaw precedent and
held that the harm standard was not vague. 55 To reach this
conclusion, the opinion pointed out that the Texas Penal Code
“define[d] harm generally as anything reasonably regarded as loss,
disadvantage, or injury” and that Chapter 33 of the same code
contained its own definition which included “injury that might
reasonably be suffered as a result of the actor’s conduct.” 56 The
opinion also noted that harm is a common word with a common

46.
Id. at 635–38.
47.
Id. at 638–39.
48.
Id. at 639.
49.
Ex Parte Maddison, 518 S.W.3d 630, 639–40 (Tex. App.—Waco 2017,
pet. ref’d).
50.
Id. at 640 (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 677) (internal quotations
omitted).
51.
Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 677) (internal quotations omitted).
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.; TEX. PENAL CODE § 33.07(a)(1) (2017) (“with the intent to harm…”).
55.
Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 640.
56.
Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 678) (internal quotations omitted).
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definition. 57 Apparently satisfied that the combination of these
definitions was sufficiently definite to give the average person fair
notice of the prohibited conduct, the opinion concluded that section
33.07(a)(1) was not unconstitutionally vague.58
In summary, the court determined that the contended harm
standard was not unconstitutionally vague because the Texas Penal
Code had a general definition, Chapter 33 of the Penal Code had a
more specific definition, and “harm” is a common word.59 Because
the court established that section 33.07(a)(1) is not
unconstitutionally broad or vague, it reversed the trial court.60
C. The Dissent: A Glimmer of Hope
Chief Justice Gray was the sole dissenter in Ex parte
Maddison.61 Though he decided there was “no reason to belabor the
legal points” upon which he based his analysis, he suggested that Ex
parte Thompson,62 Ex parte Lo,63 and Texas v. Johnson64 set forth
the correct framework.65 By his analysis, the majority’s main error
was in concluding that section 33.07(a)(1) is content neutral; he
would have determined that section 33.07(a)(1) is content based.66
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, he argued that a court must
look into the content of the speech or the intent of the speaker to
determine if the statute has been violated. 67 To illustrate his
reasoning, he suggested, hypothetically, that the statute would not
prohibit a post or page in favor of a political candidate even if it
appeared to be from, or made by, someone else. 68 However, the
same statute would prohibit an almost identical post or page
disfavoring the political candidate. 69 More complicated, Chief
Justice Gray suggests, would be a photograph of a candidate with a

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 678) (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 640–41.
Thompson, 442 S.W.3d at 325.
Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 640–41 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 641.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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caption underneath stating, “‘I vote for life.’”70 Such a post would
mandate inspection of the content and poster’s intent because it is
unclear if the poster meant to harm or help the featured candidate.71
For these reasons, the dissent concluded that the statute was
content-based and must be “presumed invalid and withstand strict
scrutiny,” requiring the state to establish its validity. 72 Because the
state did not establish validity, Chief Justice Gray opined that the
trial court should be affirmed.73
IV. CORRECTED ANALYSIS: WHERE THE WACO COURT OF APPEALS
WENT WRONG AND MADDISON’S EFFECTS
As Chief Justice Gray concluded, the majority’s main error was
failing to label the statute as content-based and apply the appropriate
level of scrutiny: strict scrutiny. 74 This failure stems from the
court’s inability to recognize the over-inclusiveness of the statute
and the modern role of the Internet. Ultimately, this inability allows
the State government to circumvent the First Amendment and
silence protected speech.
A. Content-Neutrality, Scrutiny, Overbreadth, and Vagueness
Revisited
1. Content Neutrality & Scrutiny: The Statute is Content-Based
Section 33.07(a)(1) is content-based because a court must assess
the content of the speech to determine if it is harmful or harmless.
In doing so, a court must necessarily distinguish between favored,
harmless, and disfavored, harmful, speech.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that “‘[i]f it is
necessary to look at the content of the speech in question to decide
if the speaker violated the law, then the regulation is content
based.’” 75 As an illustration, it explained that “a statute that
prohibits an adult from communicating with a minor via the internet
is content-neutral, but a statute that prohibits an adult from
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

518 S.W.3d at 641 n.1 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 641.
Id.
Id. at 640.
Thompson, 442 S.W.3d at 345 (quoting Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 15 n.12).

60

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.

[40

communicating with a minor via the internet in a sexually explicit
manner is content-based.” 76 Almost identically, a statute that
prohibits creating a web-page or profile in the name or persona of
another person would be content-neutral, but a statute that prohibits
creating a web-page or profile in the name or persona of another
person in a harmful manner is content-based.77 Most obviously, it
would be almost impossible to know, without a self-incriminating
admission, if a defendant intended to cause harm without looking at
the page or profile created and the writings, posts, expressions, and
other activities on that page.
More complex is the situation in which an Internet page or
profile is created in the name or persona of another person with the
intent to cause harm for a “legitimate” purpose. 78 For example,
many political activists create pages in the name or persona of
politicians, some of which include “profile” or “cover” photos of
these politicians, in an effort to remove that person from office.79
Additionally, many satirical websites use the name and persona of
politicians to intentionally cause political harm to the named
persons. 80 For example, The Onion’s website, under the subheading “The Trump Documents,” includes pages dedicated to both
President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence. 81
Included on those pages are documents like fake emails that appear
to be from President Trump or Vice President Pence. 82 These
illegitimate documents serve as legitimate political and social
commentary which are protected by the First Amendment.83
76.
Id. (citing Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 15 n.12).
77.
See id.
78.
Legitimate means “[c]omplying with the law; lawful.” Legitimate,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Significantly, the Texas online
impersonation statute does not carve out an exception for “legitimate,” though
harmful, conduct. See also § 33.07(a)(1).
79.
See, e.g., Donald J Trump (@thetotallyrealdnaldtrump), FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/thetotallyrealdonaldtrump/ [https://perma.cc/8T82UEWY].
80.
See, e.g., The Trump Documents, THE ONION,
http://www.theonion.com/trumpdocuments [https://perma.cc/6QPX-A5WL].
81.
Id.
82.
See Donald Trump, THE ONION (MAY 22, 2017, 9:16 AM),
https://www.theonion.com/donald-trump-1819594227 [https://perma.cc/46UNCD6N].
83.
Id.; see also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (“We do not
accede to appellee’s suggestion that the constitutional protection for a free press
applies only to the exposition of ideas . . . . What is one man’s amusement,
teaches another’s doctrine.”).
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Certainly, if The Onion were charged under section 33.07(a)(1),
a court would be required to analyze the content of the page and
associated speech to determine if it is harmless or harmful speech.
And, laws distinguishing “favored [(harmless)] speech from
disfavored [(harmful)] speech on the basis of the ideas or views
expressed are content-based.”84 While a defender of this legislation
may claim that speech is not categorically prohibited because of the
idea expressed and is instead prohibited based on the harm caused,
it is the underlying idea or view that causes the harm: but for the
author’s opinion, standing in opposition to the target’s opinion,
there would be no case—no “harm” caused, no “crime” committed,
and no speech suppressed. The law is content-based.
2. Content Neutrality & Scrutiny: A Possible Justification
Unaddressed by the Court
A possible justification, unexplored by the Maddison court, for
the content-neutral label is the secondary effects rule.85 This rule
states that in some situations “a regulation can be deemed contentneutral on the basis of the government interest the statute serves”
even if it appears content-based and may have “an incidental effect
on some speakers or messages but not to others.”86 But, the “‘mere
assertion of a content-neutral purpose [will not] be enough to save
a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content,’” and,
instead, the rule requires courts to look into the purpose and effects
of the law.87 According to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the
two classic examples of the secondary effects rule are Ward88 and
Renton.89
Even ignoring the fact that section 33.07(a)(1) discriminates
based on content on its face, the statute fails the secondary effects
test because it hinders protected speech to a much greater extent
than the ordinances upheld in Ward and Renton. The Ward decision
84. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994).
85.
See Thompson, 442 S.W.3d at 346.
86.
Id. at 345.
87.
Id. at 346 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 642).
88. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (holding a soundlevel regulation content neutral because it served the purpose of restricting noise
intrusions to residential neighborhoods).
89.
City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding a
zoning ordinance content neutral because it protected community character by
disallowing adult theaters).
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still permitted expression of protected speech, just at a quieter
level. 90 Mandating a lower volume bans neither the method of
speech nor the speech itself. Similarly, the Renton decision still
permitted operation of an adult-theater, just in a different location.91
Requiring an adult-theater to operate in a different location bans
neither the method of expression nor the expression itself. In
contrast, section 33.07(a)(1) and the Maddison decision prohibit
speakers with a legitimate purpose from exercising their freedom of
speech in the manner they choose because of the allegedly
“harmful” ideas expressed. 92 Therefore, even if the court had
applied the secondary effects rule, or if a party makes that argument
in the future, it could not and cannot save section 33.07(a)(1) from
classification as content-based.
3. Overbreadth and
Unconstitutional

Vagueness:

The

Statute

is

Facially

Because the Maddison court should have found section
33.07(a)(1) to be content-based, it must be examined under a strictscrutiny lens. Applying strict scrutiny, the statute must serve a
“compelling state interest” and utilize “the least speech-restrictive
means to achieve its goal.”93 While protecting people’s identity is
certainly a compelling state interest, the law does not employ the
least restrictive means to achieve that goal. 94 Here, because the
vagueness of the statute affects its overbreadth, vagueness is
discussed in conjunction with overbreadth.
First, the court misunderstands the roles of the Internet today. In
an eerily-foreshadowing sentence, the Maddison court stated that
law directed at activities not “necessarily associated with speech
(such as picketing or demonstrating)” will “rarely, if ever,
succeed.” 95 This statement serves only to highlight the court’s
failure to understand the modern digital world. Today, the Internet
is the new venue for political discourse, and “political debate and
90.
See Ward, 491 U.S. at 796–803.
91.
See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48–55.
92.
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 33.07(a)(1) (West 2017); Maddison, 518 S.W.3d
at 640; see also Turner, 512 U.S. at 643.
93.
Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 635–36.
94.
See id.
95.
Id. at 636.
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discussion is . . . a regular fact of digital life for many social media
users . . . .”96 For that reason, the Internet, in many situations, is on
par with picketing or demonstrating. 97 Because of the majority’s
misunderstanding, they failed to appropriately weigh the
consequences of limiting such demonstrations.
Furthermore, inclusion of the language “or other Internet
website” in section 33.07(a)(1) means that all named Internet sites
and pages could be subject to this law and not just profiles and pages
on Facebook, Instagram, and MySpace. 98 Such sites and pages
include political ads, 99 blogs, 100 discussion websites, 101 memes,102
and more. 103 As a result, not only does the statute apply to a
significant amount of conduct, including legitimate conduct, but the
statute also applies to almost every conceivable website.104
Additionally, the vague “harm” standard used in section
33.07(a)(1) expands the statute’s already wide net, unnecessarily
catching legitimate conduct. 105 The court claims that the term
“harm” is not overly vague because it has three definitions: the
general penal code definition, the Chapter 33 definition, and the
common usage definition. 106 However, the general definition
includes “anything reasonably regarded as loss.”107 The Chapter 33
definition includes “various types of damage […] and also any other
96. . Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, The Political Environment on Social
Media, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 25, 2016),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/25/the-political-environment-on-socialmedia/ [https://perma.cc/WC3T-LRKJ].
97.
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loss, disadvantage, or injury.”108 And, the common usage definition
includes “[i]njury, loss, [and] damage.” 109 These definitions
encompass just about every type of loss, which at bare minimum
broadens the applicability of the statute and increases the potential
for speech restriction.
In summary, the Internet is a thriving venue for political
discussion and discourse and requires substantial caution when
curbing the ability to participate in such expression. 110 Section
33.07(a)(1) is so vague that it over-includes not only what websites
the law is applicable to, but also what conduct is made criminal.111
The statute makes no limitations to this broad applicability and
carves out no exception for legitimate conduct.112 Therefore, it does
not employ the least restrictive means to achieve its goal and is
unconstitutionally overbroad.113
B. The First Amendment Workaround: Unconstitutional as
Applied, Even If Not Facially
Unfortunately, the Maddison court determined that section
33.07(a)(1) is not content-based and is not unconstitutionally
overbroad or vague.114 Consequently, two aspects of the opinion in
combination create a way for the Texas government to side-step the
First Amendment, making the statute, at the least, unconstitutional
as applied in certain scenarios, even if it is not unconstitutional on
its face.
The first important aspect is that the court states that “any
subsequent ‘speech’ related to [the criminalized] conduct is integral
to criminal conduct and may be prevented or punished without
violating the First Amendment.”115 Normally, when the underlying
conduct is truly criminal, stripping constitutional protection from
speech associated with that conduct is not an issue. But when the
underlying conduct is made criminal merely because the statute is
over-inclusive and fails to differentiate between legitimate and
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Harm, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See Duggan & Smith, supra note 96.
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 33.07(a)(1) (West 2017).
See id.
See Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 635–36.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 637.
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illegitimate purposes, First Amendment protection for associated
speech is inappropriately waived.
For that reason, the second important aspect of the opinion is
that the statute was not found unconstitutionally overbroad or
vague, even though it sweeps in legitimate conduct. 116 By
upholding the constitutionality of this statute, the court has
criminalized that swept-up legitimate conduct. Because that
conduct is now considered “criminal,” any speech associated with
it is no longer afforded First Amendment protection.117 Thus, some
legitimate speech authored in a legitimate way is at risk of attack
because Texas prosecutors now have the means to circumvent the
First Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Maddison was incorrectly decided. The court should
have determined that section 33.07(a)(1) was content-based, subject
to strict scrutiny, and unconstitutionally overbroad. But because the
court did not fully appreciate the over-inclusiveness of the statute
and the modern role of the Internet, it missed the mark. As a result,
the State of Texas is left with a statute that is unconstitutional on its
face. Whether or not the statute is ultimately adjudicated
unconstitutional, Texas has been left with a First Amendment
workaround. This mistake in Texas should act as a warning to all
legislatures as they work to coherently integrate law and
technology.

116.
117.

Id. at 640.
See id. at 637, 640.

